Key Extraction
for Host-Migrated Cable Modem


Cable-Modem — 110 — *Message with Encrypted Keying Material* — 150 — Host PC — 155

Cable — 105

Traffic Decryption Engine — 100 — 115

Message with Decrypted Keying Material — 165

Driver Software

Material Decryption Software — 160

Fig. 1

Security Threat to Key Extraction
on Host-Migrated Cable Modem

Decryption Key handling
in CCCM MAC chip

Cable Modem

MAC Chip 30∂

3⁰0

305

DES Engine

Key Material Register Bank

Extracted Key Material

FIG 3

Key Material Register Bank
in CM Media Access Controller (MAC) Chip

410

Keying Material Register Bank

405

400

SID#

Write Enable

Key Destroy

Key Material

Current Key		Next Key	
DES Key	Init Vector	DES Key	Init Vector

FIG 4

Rules Flow-Chart

500

Startup → Disable Key Writes for all SIDs

505

Message transmitted from headend → Is message addressed to this CM ?
- No → **510** Disregard message
- Yes →

515 Does message contain keying material ?
- No → **520** Process message normally
- Yes →

520 Pass TDES-encrypted keying material to host (for decryption)

→ **585** Enable write of decrypted keying material from host to KMRB for this SID

555

SID Number Written to KMRB

↓

560 Destroy keying material for that SID

↓

565 Disable key writes for that SID

530 Decrypted keying material written from host for a SID

↓

535 Is key write enabled for this SID ?
- No → **540** Disregard keying material
- Yes →

545 Write keying material to KMRB

↓

550 Disable key writes for this SID

CM = Cable Modem
CMTS = CM Termination System (headend)
SID = Service ID (datastream)
TDES = Triple-DES
KMRB = Keying Material Register Bank
　　　　(in CM MAC chip)

FIG 5

Generalized Protection case

625

Rogue
Software or
Commands

Communications
Channel
used for
Illicit Purposes

Rogue
Software or
Commands

} Security Threats

Individual
Node
Controller

620

Individual
Node
Controller

615

600

Controlled
Node

610

Controlled
Node

605

Central
Controller

Secure Network

FIG 6